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Abstract
This paper provides an assessment of the work done by the Organ on 
National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) in post-
2008 Zimbabwe. ONHRI was employed by the Zimbabwean government 
(precisely as Government of National Unity) to ensure national healing 
and integration. The efficacy of top-down approaches to social cohesion 
in post-conf lict contexts is questioned. The paper outlines how political 
expediency, mistrust and polarisation debilitated the work of ONHRI. 
There was little consultation done in creating ONHRI, especially with 
communities affected by political violence. Academics, civil society, 
smaller political parties and private entities were left out of the process of 
creating social cohesion mechanisms. For the Zimbabwe African National 
Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the Organ was a concession on their 
part to the demands of the MDC and this led to problems in implementing 
its mandate. What transpired became a political cat and mouse game in 
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which actors at the national level frustrated the process of uncovering the 
truth and the promotion of healing. ONHRI’s work has to be understood 
within a context of political competition in the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) in which self-interest overtook the mandate of the Organ. 
The paper therefore argues that Zimbabwe lost an opportunity to entrench 
grassroots social cohesion and healing processes. 
Keywords: National healing, social cohesion, Zimbabwe, Global Political 
Agreement, transitional justice
Introduction 
This paper provides an analysis of Zimbabwe’s Organ on National Healing, 
Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) as a mechanism of achieving 
national healing, reconciliation and social integration. It highlights how 
top-down approaches to national healing are ill-equipped to achieve any 
meaningful impact at the grassroots. The establishment of the Organ 
was expected to usher in a promising era for most victims of violence in 
Zimbabwe. The work of the Organ did not meet the expectations, however, 
as it failed to provide any recourse for victims and survivors of violence. 
National healing has thus remained a dream. The paper draws from a wide-
ranging selection of literature in order to highlight the problems inherent 
in initiating a national healing process as a centralised process without the 
participation of those at the grassroots. It highlights how national healing in 
Zimbabwe was captured by the political elites. It was turned into a political 
chess game with little regard for the process of social cohesion and healing. 
Without any legal powers, the Organ could not enforce any agreements or 
codes of conduct. The paper will cite many commentators who argue that 
the Organ was a political smokescreen for ZANU-PF to appear as if they 
were taking transitional justice seriously. What is clear from research is 
that the Organ was ineffective in its approach and performance, and in its 
objective of providing transitional justice.
Boraine (2006) argues that there are five key pillars constituting a 
holistic approach to transitional justice: accountability, truth recovery, 
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reconciliation, institutional reform, and reparations. However, the Organ 
in Zimbabwe failed to meet any of these requirements. The Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) did not provide for reparations or institutional reforms. 
The process to achieve transitional justice is usually implemented through 
structures known as truth and reconciliation commissions, such as those 
in South Africa and Rwanda. Torpey (2006) argues that before such 
commissions are established, there is a need to set up global processes 
that cater for pacification, democratic transition and legal procedures 
relating to perpetrators of violent acts. This will also include procedures 
for criminal proceedings, reparation programmes and long-term security 
measures. Looking at the Organ in Zimbabwe through such conceptual 
lenses, however, provides a picture of a hastily put together institution, 
born out of compromise, and without the necessary structural support to 
perform the job of national healing. 
This paper will examine these issues according to the following structure: 
First, historical processes of violence and top-down reconciliation in 
Zimbabwe will be interrogated. After a note on methodology, this is 
followed by a look at the history of the Organ, its structure, operations and 
key challenges. These challenges include polarisation and the difficulties 
of enforcement; lack of political will and commitment; the dilemma over 
what to do with perpetrators of violence; and lack of understanding by 
the Organ of the complexities of violence. The article will then assess the 
efficacy of top-down approaches by examining the extent to which local 
communities, and especially women, have been engaged. Lastly, the article 
presents some alternative local approaches to reconciliation. Then some 
concluding remarks.
Historical processes of violence and top-down 
reconciliation in Zimbabwe
The historical fabric of the Zimbabwean nation is steeped in violence. 
After all, the country was born out of a violent liberation struggle after 
almost a century of brutal colonial rule. In tracing the roots of violence 
in Zimbabwe, it is important to note, from a post-colonial standpoint, 
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that what we are witnessing today has its roots within the colonial system. 
As Chung (2007:165) aptly notes, ‘the culture and political polarity that 
leads to the killing of opposition members has its roots in the colonial settler 
heritage’. State power was used by white people to violently evict blacks 
from fertile lands (Muchemwa et al. 2013). Black Zimbabweans responded 
violently to brutal colonial rule through the First Chimurenga war which 
was ruthlessly crushed, and then the Second Chimurenga which led to a 
negotiated settlement and independence. Structural and institutionalised 
violence did not come to an end, however. It was built into the structures 
of state governance, and became an institutional characteristic for politics 
and change in independent Zimbabwe. 
The pre-colonial era saw Shona-speaking societies emerging in the middle 
Limpopo valley in the 9th century before moving on to the Zimbabwean 
highlands. In the 11th century, many states rose and fell including the 
Kingdom of Mapungubwe with the capital of Great Zimbabwe. The Mutapa 
State existed from 1450 to 1760, and the early 17th century saw the rise of 
the Rozvi State. Zimbabwe was under colonial rule from 1888 when Cecil 
Rhodes's British South Africa Company obtained a concession for mining 
rights from King Lobengula of the Ndebele peoples which he (Rhodes) used 
to persuade the government of the United Kingdom to grant a royal charter. 
After obtaining this charter the Pioneer Column (a group of white settlers 
protected by well-armed British South Africa Police [BSAP]) travelled from 
South Africa and raised the Union Jack at Fort Salisbury (now Harare). 
The Ndebele rose up in insurrection which saw the death of their leader, King 
Lobengula. Another uprising, the First Chimurenga, was brutally crushed 
and spirit mediums Kaguvi and Nehanda, who had led the revolt among 
the Shona, were hanged. The white-minority Rhodesian government led by 
Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front (RF) dropped the designation ‘Southern’ in 
1964 and issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the 
United Kingdom on 11 November 1965.
In 1978 the white Rhodesian government under Ian Smith signed an Internal 
Settlement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa that gave birth to Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia. The following year negotiations with liberation movements 
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under the auspices of the Patriotic Front commenced at Lancaster House 
in Britain, ushering in majority rule on 18 April 1980. At independence the 
black government embarked on a social development project that saw an 
increase in social amenities, especially health care and education. Robert 
Mugabe won the first democratic election and preached reconciliation, 
arguing that:
If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend 
and an ally with the same national interests, loyalty, rights and duties 
as myself. If yesterday you hated me today you cannot avoid the love 
that binds you to me and me to you. Is it not folly, therefore, in these 
circumstances that anybody should revive the wounds and grievances of 
the past? The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten 
(Huyse 2003:37).
This was a rather cosmetic papering over of historical conf licts, which 
required a much wider process of healing that included the grassroots. 
Mugabe and white capital agreed on an approach to reconciliation which 
did not address the needs of victims at the grassroots, thus sowing the seeds 
for the post-2000 land invasions by veterans of the liberation struggle. 
Post-colonial peace in Zimbabwe was short-lived, as the Zimbabwe National 
Army unit known as Fifth Brigade, descended on Matebeleland and 
Midlands regions to suppress ex-Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army 
(ZIPRA) fighters and civilians. In 1962 ZAPU, led by Joshua Nkomo, was 
split into two, which saw a mostly Shona ethnic group led by Ndabaningi 
Sithole leaving ZAPU to form the rival party ZANU-PF. This sowed seeds 
of mistrust and division along tribal lines which would later boil over into 
open civil strife and leave 20 000 people dead (Muchemwa et al. 2013). 
The strife was ended when another top-down agreement was reached by 
the political elites in which a Unity Accord was signed and Joshua Nkomo 
became vice-president of the country. Victims and communities were left 
out of this process and nothing was done to ensure healing and to cater for 
the traumatic experiences of communities in the region. By the early 1990s 
the spending on social services, including free primary education, was 
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causing serious budget deficits and, following advice from the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, the Zimbabwean government adopted 
the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The austerity 
measures that characterised the SAPs, coupled with devaluation and mass 
retrenchments, affected the poor negatively. The introduction of user fees 
meant that most social services were out of reach for the poor, especially in 
rural areas. The drought in 1992 worsened the situation.
By early 2000 Zimbabwe was facing an unprecedented social and economic 
crisis. The deteriorating economic situation adversely impacted on the 
pace of land reform. The food riots in 1998 were the beginning of open 
protest against the ZANU-PF establishment in post-colonial Zimbabwe. 
The economy was taking a battering, as the costs of Zimbabwe’s involvement 
in the Congo war and war veterans’ pay-outs took their toll. The Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) took the lead as a conglomeration of 
civil society organisations and challenged the ruling hegemony with the 
formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) – the first real 
threat to ZANU-PF’s political hegemony in Zimbabwe. The rejection of the 
draft constitution in February 2000 was a precursor to the land occupations 
in Zimbabwe – a period popularly known as jambanja (chaos) due to 
the violent nature of the process. This led to a serious reduction in food 
and crop production, leading to food shortages and widespread hunger. 
The ensuing crisis was exacerbated by the economic sanctions of America 
and its allies, that led to world record inf lation, cash shortages, fuel 
shortages, massive unemployment and mass migration of skilled and 
unskilled labour.
Electoral Violence
Electoral violence has been a further part of the Zimbabwean political 
landscape since 1980. The violence became much more pronounced at the 
turn of the twenty-first century as Zimbabwe witnessed the emergence of 
a strong opposition party with the formation of the MDC in 1999. Selby 
(2006:3) highlights that Zimbabwe since 2000 has been dominated by 
violence, political intolerance and intimidation, economic implosion, 
17
Efficacy of top-down approaches to post-conflict social coexistence
food insecurity and general uncertainty. In many ways this crisis was an 
unavoidable culmination of unresolved and deep-rooted resource and race 
disparities, but the crisis has been dominated by ZANU-PF’s often ruthless 
struggle to retain power. There was a sudden instrumentalisation of power 
in what Selby (2006:4) calls the rejuvenation of the security state: 
Had ZANU-PF lost power in 2000, senior officials would probably have 
been held accountable for a range of unresolved issues such as the genocide 
in Matabeleland, key corruption scandals of the 1990s, and the looting 
of the War Victims’ Fund. Senior officials therefore had a clear interest in 
retaining power which clearly influenced ZANU-PF’s post-2000 strategies. 
The nature of the state changed considerably during the late 1990s with the 
co-option of the war veterans and the growing influence of an impatient 
and radical empowerment alliance. 
There is no way we can talk of a land reform movement in Zimbabwe without 
the crucial intervention of the state. More specifically, understanding 
the forced land takeovers can only be accomplished through a thorough 
analysis of the monopolisation and militarisation of state apparatuses. 
Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004:356) elucidate that this authoritarianism 
involved an ‘internal reconfiguration of Zimbabwean state politics’ leading 
to the emergence of domestic tyranny.
A referendum held in February 2000 led to an overwhelming defeat for 
government. According to Kagoro (2004:249), ‘it was a protest vote against 
the manner in which the constitution-making process had been carried out 
by the government’, as well as ‘an angry protest against the performance 
of the government and parlous state of the economy’. This unprecedented 
defeat of the ruling party by an opposition party (which, according to 
ZANU-PF, was backed by white commercial farmers and the West) appeared 
to precipitate the largely state-sponsored land invasions, political violence, 
institutional interference and economic decline that were to follow – 
although there was of course a much longer and more complex history 
behind these trends (Hammar 2005:4). A massive campaign instigated by 
and comprising the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the MDC 
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and the white Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) led to the defeat of the 
draft constitution at the polls, with Mugabe immediately accepting the 
result. But, within days, twelve war veterans occupied farms in Masvingo 
Province, proclaiming that the white farmers had connived to defeat the 
constitution in the referendum. The Zimbabwe National Liberation War 
Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) supported these occupations and called 
for further action as a way of demonstrating the need for land. When 
leaders of the war veterans association and the ruling party realised by the 
end of March that white farmers were actively campaigning for the MDC, 
and encouraging farm workers to do the same, farm occupations became 
more violent with the build-up to the political campaign for the June 2000 
parliamentary elections (Moyo 2001:318).
Elections in 2002, 2005 and 2008 were highly contested with many incidents 
of violence. A report by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum shows 
there were 3180 reported cases of organised violence and torture between 
March 2008 and July 2009 perpetrated by state institutions such as the 
police, army and intelligence officers (Crisis Zimbabwe 2009). Research 
and Advocacy Unit (2011:1) noted that the period before the June 2008 
runoff presidential election ‘saw many people losing their lives, maimed, 
raped, abducted, losing properties and exposed to all forms of torture all in 
the name of fighting for political hegemony’. The violence in 2008 before 
the presidential runoff election saw many cases of members of communities 
beating and killing each other. ZANU-PF supporters led by war veterans 
set up base camps in which people were forced to come at night and pledge 
support for the party (Alexander and Tendi 2008). Known opposition 
supporters were beaten and tortured at the base camps. These incidents 
of violence led to Morgan Tsvangirai withdrawing from the election, yet 
the elections proceeded, with Robert Mugabe victorious. The win was 
however contested and not accepted worldwide, leading to negotiations for 
a Government of National Unity. What is clear from the above discussion 
is how violence was already institutionalised within the state apparatus. 
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Methodological note
This paper is based on document analysis conducted through systematic 
review. Systematic review is appropriate in identifying, appraising and 
synthesising research-based evidence and presenting it in an accessible 
format (Mulrow 1994). A systematic review attempts to collate all 
empirical evidence that fits pre-specified eligibility criteria in order to 
answer a specific research question. It uses explicit, systematic methods 
that are selected with a view to minimising bias, thus providing more 
reliable findings from which conclusions can be drawn and decisions made 
(Antman et al. 1992; Oxman and Guyatt 1993). Unlike traditional reviews, 
the purpose of a systematic review is to provide as complete a list as possible 
of all the published and unpublished studies relating to a particular subject 
area. While traditional reviews attempt to summarise results of a number 
of studies, systematic reviews use explicit and rigorous criteria to identify, 
critically evaluate and synthesise all the literature on a particular topic. 
For this paper, searches on literature relevant to social cohesion and 
national healing in Zimbabwe were conducted on the internet, and in 
journal articles, books and newspapers. 
History of the Organ on National Healing, 
Reconciliation and Integration
Zimbabwe’s major political parties signed a historic political agreement on 
15 September 2008 that gave birth to the Government of National Unity 
(GNU). The deal brokered by former South African president Thabo Mbeki 
brought together ZANU-PF and the two Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) formations into a single government as a way to end the political 
impasse which had degenerated into a socio-economic crisis. The power 
sharing arrangement in Zimbabwe provides an important insight into how 
transitional formations can provide a pathway to sustainable peace and the 
well-being of citizens. It is intriguing to understand the internal dynamics 
of this political ‘Frankenstein’, in which sworn enemies are forced to 
co-exist for the betterment of the populace. Clearly, the GNU was riddled 
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with problems from its inception, coming into fruition after months of 
negotiations, marked by accusations and counter accusations. With three 
parties making up the government, ‘the implication is that despite being 
in the same cabinet, the ministers put party loyalty first. They do not view 
themselves as one unit and this surely is not good for state affairs’ (Chigora 
and Guzura 2011:25). 
The agreement included sections on social cohesion and national 
reconciliation. The relevant sections of The Global Political Agreement, 
Article VII, are cited below to highlight the parties’ commitment to 
national healing given the widespread political violence after 2000.
Article VII: Promotion of Equality, National healing, Cohesion 
and Unity 
7.  Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity 
7.1 The Parties hereby agree that the new Government: … 
c)  shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly 
advise on what measures might be necessary and practicable to achieve 
national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre- and post-
independence political conflicts; and 
d) will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among 
Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency 
irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation. 
Section 7.1c thus provides for the establishment of ONHRI. In a speech in 
2009, Sekai Holland, then Minister responsible for the Organ, noted that: 
‘the key result area…was the launching of…the machinery for national 
healing, reconciliation and integration… [with] three specific targets…: 
launch the Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration 
and establish a secretariat; hold pre‐conference workshops for local and 
international experts; establish machinery and processes for national 
healing, reconciliation and integration’ (Holland 2009:2).
Mbire (2011) argues that the ONHRI provided a new frame through which 
the discourses on transitional justice, reconciliation and national healing 
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could be understood. The task of the Organ however was soon limited to 
an advisory role as it fell to the Principals (the three political leaders who 
signed the Global Political Agreement) to accept or decline the offered 
proposals. According to the then Minister Holland in a speech at Chatham 
House in 2012, the GPA ‘gives us the mandate as the Organ to advise 
on what mechanisms to address pre- and post-independence conf licts’ 
(Chatham House 2010). This was a serious f law in that the Organ could 
not make independent decisions outside the Principals. Its proposals were 
voluntary and not legally binding. In essence the Organ was toothless. 
As an advisory body its tasks did not extend beyond producing documents 
and voluntary codes of conduct. 
Structure and operations of ONHRI
The ONHRI was headed by three co-ministers appointed by the president 
but nominated by each of the three political parties. The three included Vice-
President John Landa Nkomo (ZANU-PF), Gibson Sibanda (Movement for 
Democratic Change faction led by Welshman Ncube, known as MDC-N 
founder member, later replaced by Moses Mzila-Ndhlovhu when he passed 
away) and Sekai Holland (Movement for Democratic Change faction led by 
Morgan Tsvangirayi, known as MDC-T founder member). There was both 
cause for optimism and concern when the three were chosen (Chipaike 
2013). The optimism stemmed from the belief that appointing such very 
senior members of each party ref lected the great deal of importance the 
GNU placed on social cohesion and national healing. On the other hand, 
however, placing senior members in these roles was really geared towards 
ensuring advantage in manoeuvring the work of the Organ towards certain 
political goals. The members were chosen by party leadership without 
any form of consultation. Zimbabwe Watch and Crisis Coalition (2008) 
thus concludes that political elites excluded the concerned and affected 
communities from any discussion of building up a mechanism for national 
healing. The three ministers embarked on a wide-ranging consultation 
exercise with traditional leaders, churches and civil society, but not with 
the victims of violence in Zimbabwe. The result was that only the elite 
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with access to traditional and church leaders were heard. The exclusion 
of rural women and children from these consultations highlights another 
patronising tendency of top-down approaches to governance by the 
Zimbabwean state. In November 2011 ONHRI reported that it had finished 
drafting a code of conduct to hold political parties perpetrating violence 
to account for their actions. The code emphasised that political parties 
should be able to campaign and disseminate their political ideas around 
the country without fear. It was a voluntary mechanism without any legal 
backing. As such, the Organ had no power or authority to compel political 
actors to act in a peaceful manner. The Organ was thus largely ceremonial, 
and without any real impact on the lives of ordinary Zimbabweans. 
Challenges facing ONHRI
Polarisation and the challenges of enforcing healing and coercion
ONHRI was a child of a compromise government made up of conf licting 
and suspicious partners. The polarised nature of the political scene 
made any work towards national healing almost impossible as any talk 
of violence was seen as political manoeuvring to discredit ZANU-PF. 
The GNU was championed as a power-sharing arrangement to end the 
political crisis in Zimbabwe. Yet at its worst it was a dysfunctional animal 
with separate heads pulling in different directions. Burgess (2011:101) 
notes that successful power sharing is capable, in theory, of preventing 
the outbreak of violence by bringing all major stakeholders to the table. 
The Zimbabwean case of power sharing and subsequent political brokerage 
showcases the overall fragility, but effectiveness towards peace, of putting 
to the test such systems after election disputes (Neal 2012). There were, 
then, grave issues around the dysfunctionality of the GNU as a viable 
governance instrument in Zimbabwe. Despite successes in reducing both 
record-breaking inf lation and political violence, the GNU faced serious 
problems in functional and control areas (see Mandaza 2012). One of the 
most interesting cases was the long-drawn contestation over the control of 
money from diamond deposits, which were allegedly not going through the 
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MDC-controlled Ministry of Finance. Suspicion and accusations saturated 
the everyday operations of a government with such inconvenient partners.
Lack of political will and commitment
Whilst the GPA provided a framework to implement national healing and 
social cohesion, the political actors remained unwilling to ensure the full 
implementation of the agreements. The language of Article VII in the 
agreement that led to the birth of the Organ highlights how provisions of 
social cohesion are dependent on the will of the political parties who had 
the power or choice to stall any process. Machakanja (2010:4) argues that:
Article 7.1(c), which focuses on national healing, cohesion and unity, is also 
stated in very vague and ambiguous terms as it lumps together conflicts 
from different historical periods. This lack of clarity and specificity makes 
the job of national healing overwhelming as the process may take decades. 
Such vagueness abrogates the ZANU-PF party from taking social 
responsibility in accounting for post-independence human rights violations.
Zimbabwe has gone through different epochs of violence so often that 
for any mechanism to succeed there first needs to be an admission and 
acceptance of historical moments of violence. There are still ‘silences’ 
on the part of the state on the exact nature of the 1987 conf licts in the 
Matebeleland regions known as Gukurahundi where, according to the 
Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice (1997), 20 000 people lost their 
lives. Mapuweyi (2014:9) notes the view of MDC-N on this issue: 
Moses Mzila-Ndlovu, who replaced Gibson Sibanda on the organ following 
the death of the MDC founder, summed up the civil society and private 
media sentiments saying, ZANU-PF was making a mistake by trying to 
sweep the Gukurahundi issue under the carpet because many people are 
still angry about the massacres and want the issue discussed in public and 
they also want compensation.
There is thus no clarity on which exact period the Organ focused on and 
whether it had the mandate to finally provide impetus towards resolving 
social justice for victims of the violence in the Matebeleland region. 
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The lack of political will was thus a deliberate ploy especially for those 
political actors who had vested interests in ensuring their part in violent 
activities remained (and remains) hidden across the political spectrum. 
Any healing has to start with admission and confession of past atrocities in 
colonial and post-colonial eras. Machakanja (2010) argues that ZANU-PF 
even after the signing of the GPA continued to arrest and detain political 
activists aligned to the MDC parties. This went against the spirit of social 
cohesion and healing and, in the eyes of some observers, highlighted the 
disregard and unwillingness of ZANU-PF to follow the provisions of the 
GPA (Machakanja 2010). 
The question about what to do with perpetrators of violence
One of the key questions that was never addressed by the GPA but is now 
included in the work of the Organ is what to do with known perpetrators 
of political violence in Zimbabwe. The agreement was a negotiated affair 
between political leaders with the aim of ending a political impasse. 
Thus from the onset of negotiations, ‘[i]t [was] the needs of the nation, not 
individuals, that [were] of paramount concern…’ (Machakanja 2010:5). 
Individuals’ search for truth, justice or compensation was to take a back 
seat for the good of the nation. The macro focus of the GPA thus ignored 
critical issues affecting communities at a local level. National healing 
cannot be a national affair for politicians, but is rather a concern for people 
now living together who might have turned against each other in the past 
– leading to deaths, serious injuries as well as inter-generational grudges 
and hatred. Without understanding how healing and social cohesion are 
intricately relational issues concerned with lived experiences of individuals, 
the Organ was also bound to become irrelevant to the victims of violence. 
Any transitional justice mechanism needs to include measures to deal 
with perpetrators of violence. If amnesty is offered, it has to be based 
on total transparency and public acceptance of violent acts in the past. 
The Organ has no plan in place even for compensation of victims, because 
‘…Article VII precludes civil claims against perpetrators as this [was] 
likely to erode the state’s limited fiscus…Article VII does not represent an 
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individual-friendly process but rather a politically-orchestrated national 
healing and reconciliation project’ (Machakanja 2010:5). The project had 
little to offer victims and survivors of violence. Their physical, spiritual and 
emotional needs were not catered for in the negotiations. Gabriel Shumba, 
speaking at Chatham House, argued that the perpetrators of post-colonial 
violence have never been arrested and that ‘these people are still roaming 
the streets; they are part of the power sharing agreement’ (Chatham 
House 2010).
The failure to understand the complexities of violence in 
Zimbabwe
The Organ seemed to have been limited in its scope to the post-electoral 
violence of 2000. In fact, the then Minister Holland admitted that the 
Organ categorised violence as mainly political and thus as perpetrated 
by political parties – thereby masking various complex factors around 
race, ethnicity and gender. Whilst the majority of cases of violence may 
indeed be intertwined with periods of political upheavals, most cases 
usually do involve complex questions around the social make-up of 
communities. A good example is violence against women – including rape 
– perpetrated under periods of political violence. Political promotion of 
violence is intertwined with a patriarchal social system in which women’s 
bodies are portrayed as sexual things. Moyo (2008) argues that violence 
in Zimbabwe is structural in nature and steeped in historical processes. 
These processes can be explained through a political economy approach 
but there are also social factors such as ethnicity, race and gender which 
intersect with politics to create complexities in Zimbabwean violence. 
To simply locate violence as an inter-party phenomenon without asking 
how personal, family, community, regional and ethnic grudges tend to 
play out within communities masks the true nature of how violence occurs 
and is experienced. There are different forms of violence which include 
physical, symbolic, mental and psychological violence. To understand 
the interplay of all these forms of violence within a transitional justice 
framework requires understanding the f luid nature of violence as a process 
26
Manase Kudzai Chiweshe
and not an event. This requires a more in-depth analysis of the nature and 
factors inf luencing violence as a historical process in Zimbabwe. The Organ 
did not undertake such an analysis, erroneously categorising violence as a 
political act perpetrated through political party structures.  
Hiding in plain sight: the Organ’s experience with  
the public
The Organ did little to engage communities. There may be various factors 
to explain this, which include lack of skills, resources, political space or 
the will to engage the grassroots. This lack of engagement led Mapuweyi 
(2014) to label the Organ the ‘Invisible ONHRI’ due to a serious lack of 
reporting of its activities in the major newspapers in Zimbabwe. Due to 
this invisibility, the Organ was rendered useless to most Zimbabweans who 
did not know or understand what its role included. Chipaike (2013:22) 
further asserts that the Organ:
…ha(s) not been proactive in the communities. What they have simply 
done is to issue… statements in the media calling upon people to desist 
from political violence (Newsday, 27 July 2012). Instead of mobilising 
communities against violence before it occurs, they have mainly been 
reacting to those occurrences. 
The Organ had no community or grassroots structures, which seriously 
limited its effectiveness. National level processes are concentrated in the 
capital Harare with very little devolution to districts and wards. Given the 
limited access of rural communities to news sources such as newspapers 
or television, news of the Organ was not reaching the grassroots. 
The urban bias of the Organ, which appeared to place an emphasis on 
engaging ‘experts’ and conducting international travels to hold meetings in 
the United States of America and in South Africa, meant that it was separated 
from the rural masses who had lived through violence as perpetrators, 
survivors and victims. There was no investment in community structures 
for social cohesion and national healing. The process of the creation of 
the Organ and the planning of its activities was not participatory, which 
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seriously limited the input of most ordinary Zimbabweans who did not fit 
into the categories of traditional chiefs, experts, or people in the Diaspora 
or in the church. 
In 2013, after the elections paved the way for the ‘death’ of the GPA and 
GNU, the Organ died as a legal entity. National healing and post-conf lict 
justice were not made explicit in the new constitution which ushered in the 
elections. With ZANU-PF the ideology of the liberation struggle remains 
dominant and constructed narrowly to shower praise on the ruling elite. 
This ideology has led to the demonising of dissenting voices and the 
sweeping under the carpet of many problems. As noted elsewhere in this 
paper – except for one description by the president of Gukurahundi as 
a ‘moment of madness’ – nothing has been done to initiate processes of 
healing, reparations and social cohesion (New Zimbabwe no date).
Women’s exclusion from national healing processes
The role of women in the national healing process has remained marginal. 
The exclusion of women from these processes is rather worrying given 
that many women suffered serious trauma due to beatings, rape, murder 
and sexual abuse. Shaba (2011) argues that women were the majority of 
victims in post-2008 violence yet the Organ has proven ineffective in the 
following ways: The Organ did not provide a gendered analysis of violence 
in Zimbabwe which would have spelt out how the experience and impact 
of, as well as the nature of, violence remain gendered. It did not seek to 
understand how perpetrators, survivors and victims are all gendered beings 
and that gender is a central issue in understanding the historical processes 
of violence. Victims and perpetrators were assumed to be homogenous 
without further interrogation or analysis. This mirrors the historical 
patriarchal nature of the Zimbabwean state.
Major political parties involved in the GNU remain male-dominated 
and patriarchal in orientation. Women are represented in the two 
biggest parties, the MDC and ZANU-PF, yet the women’s wings of these 
parties remain oriented towards the political goals of male leaders. 
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Without women-centred political parties, the efforts of women within 
these patriarchal structures will achieve very little as women’s activist 
Thoko Matshe notes, ‘Zimbabwe will still be a patriarchal state no matter 
who wins [the elections] currently, so for women it is 'Aluta Continua' – 
the struggle continues’ (Jones 2008). In a gender analysis of the Global 
Political Agreement, Mugadza (2011:6) argues that:
There have been many issues related to politically motivated violence in 
Zimbabwe’s past that necessitate pro vision for a comprehensive national 
healing and cohesion mechanism, especially for women who bore the brunt 
of the conflict in 2008. …Given that healing and cohesion are not clarified, 
there is a danger that it will be difficult to implement anything under this 
article, to the detriment of women who suffer violence, discrimination and 
intolerance disproportionately.
Even in practice the Organ proved incapable of responding to historical 
gendered processes of violence or of challenging the patriarchal status quo 
which often promotes abuse of women in conf lict situations. The Organ 
had no capacity or mechanisms to deal with women victims because of the 
unique nature – often both physically and mentally brutal – of violence 
against women. 
Efficacy of top-down approaches
Experiences from Zimbabwe highlight the serious limitations of top-
down approaches to national healing and social cohesion. Without 
the involvement of communities – especially the input of victims – any 
mechanism for healing after conf lict will fail to achieve its objectives. 
There was naivety in believing that social cohesion can be forced from 
above. Without full participation of communities, the Organ was doomed 
to fail in achieving its mandate. For commentators such as Muchemwa 
et al. (2013) this is precisely what ZANU-PF wanted. ZANU-PF did not 
want an effective process which provided truth and reconciliation for the 
post-independence conf licts, particularly in Matebeleland and Midlands 
in 1987, and the 2008 post-election violence (Dzinesa 2012; Machakanja 
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2010). The Organ was an instrument of the powerful, and thus served 
a limited political purpose which reduced transitional justice to mere 
statements and consultative meetings with experts. 
Top-down approaches rarely take a victim’s rights perspective. The major 
focus is on broader political and economic considerations which do not 
necessarily favour the rights of the victims. Political elites have vested 
interests in post-conf lict mechanisms which do not necessarily serve the 
needs of the ordinary people. The Zimbabwean example highlights how 
the need for self-preservation especially within ZANU-PF has resulted 
in tokenistic approaches to national healing. In arguing for a grassroots-
based approach to national healing in Zimbabwe, Thomson and Jazdowska 
(2012:77) point out that:
…local communities hold the key to a more inclusive and sustainable 
restorative justice process in Zimbabwe (and elsewhere). The more people 
that participate in, and benefit from, a transitional justice programme, 
the broader the ‘ownership’ generated, and the more chance there is that 
outcomes will be sustained. Transitional justice, and its content, should 
not therefore be the sole preserve of international lawyers, human rights 
NGOs /or national politicians, as it so often is. Instead, alongside these 
aforementioned practitioners, those who suffered politically motivated 
violence also need to participate in policy formulation and decision-making.
Yet the Organ was dominated by experts of all kinds speaking for the victims. 
The lived experiences of communities that suffered trauma remain silenced. 
Muchemwa et al. (2013) argue that the failures of the initial reconciliation 
project at independence were reborn with the Organ under the Government 
of National Unity. They argue that: 
…while the notion of resuscitating reconciliation is an important step 
towards durable peace, this institutionalised, state-centric and state-
propelled project is haunted by the very same challenges that undermined 
and shattered its predecessor…reconciliation and healing project, which 
is politically engineered and institutionally driven without being inclusive 
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and community driven, (and) is a mere token that comes at the expense of 
durable peace and the actual victims of violence and impunity (Muchemwa 
et al. 2013:145).
At a ‘meeting held in Bulawayo, on 26 November 2009, ONHRI members 
exchanged harsh words with former ZIPRA liberation fighters who accused 
them of living a lavish life on the national healing assignment at the 
expense of victims who are struggling to eke out a living’ (Muchemwa et al. 
2013:154). This is probably the greatest weakness of state-centric, top-down 
approaches carried out by state bureaucracies. The resources expended 
on the functions of the Organ with three co-ministers all with a salary, 
benefits and allowances, day to day administration and staffing together 
with foreign trips could, in principle, have gone a long way to initiating and 
establishing community cohesion projects. Top-down approaches are thus 
top heavy, requiring enormous financial outlays that do not necessarily 
f low to the communities or meet any needs of the victims or survivors. 
In the following section, a consideration is made of how indigenous systems 
can be factored into local social cohesion and reconciliation processes. 
Infusing indigenous systems in social cohesion 
processes
Chimuka (2009) uses Shona concepts of kugarisana (cordial co-existence) 
and kunzwanana (mutual understanding of one another) to highlight an 
approach grounded in Ubuntu to explain social cohesion in Shona societies. 
Such an understanding grounds social cohesion as something inherent 
in African social systems. Zimbabwean communities have endogenous 
systems of promoting social cohesion and healing. Amongst the Shona, 
concepts such as kugarisana and kunzwanana assist in explaining social 
cohesion in Shona societies. Communities have knowledge accumulated 
over centuries on how to manage conf licts and ensure social cohesion. 
Such knowledge was however not utilised by the Organ. In explaining these 
concepts Chimuka (2009:117) argues that: 
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…Kunzwanana (mutual understanding) and kugarisana (peaceful co-
existence) are still relevant to the moral, legal and political spheres, though 
some modifications are anticipated to reflect the changed needs of modern 
social configurations. Historically, Kunzwanana was conceptualized as the 
recognition by one (or a group of people) of the humanity of the other 
(or group of people). This recognition meant the creation of space for the 
other. Admittedly, one gained direct access to ubuntu through a certain 
entrance. In principle, there was so single and rigid access point. The family 
was the usual starting point. Civic relationships were cemented by blood – 
(hukama). One then went out and got connected to the wider web of people 
related largely by blood.
Relations are not only based on blood but sharing a totem can lead to 
building of community spirit. Peter (2007) defines totem as an animal, plant, 
or natural object (or representation of an object) that serves as the emblem of 
a clan or family among traditional people. It represents a mystical or ritual 
bond of unity within the group. Such interpersonal relationships, built over 
time, is the basis upon which that social cohesion is hinged.
Conclusion
This paper has shown how top-down approaches are inadequate in achieving 
national healing and social cohesion. I have argued that any sustained 
search for national healing requires the active participation and voices of 
communities, survivors and victims of violence. Through an analysis of 
various processes, the paper has shown how the Organ tasked with national 
healing under the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe became a 
tokenistic window-dressing exercise meant as an obligation rather than a 
duty to implement a process of forgiveness and healing. The institutional 
apparatus of violence in Zimbabwe was not challenged or dismantled, 
which makes it inevitable that Zimbabwe will experience further episodes 
of violence and societal fractures. The paper concludes that any hope for 
lasting peace and social cohesion in Zimbabwe depends on the willingness 
of political elites to allow communities the space and support to engage in 
processes of engaging historical hurts, where truth, justice and reparations 
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